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EXTREME POLICY MAKEOVER: RE-EVALUATING
CURRENT U.S.-VIETNAM RELATIONS UNDER THE
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT
Kevin V. Tut
Abstract: Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accord in 1973, the
relationship between the United States and Vietnam remained essentially frozen. In
2000, the signing of the United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement was an epic
step in the normalization of relations. In addition, the BTA was hailed as a means of
effectuating positive change in the area of Vietnam's human rights. Unfortunately, the
state of religious freedom in Vietnam has deteriorated while economic ties with the
United States have strengthened. Despite Vietnam's purported respect for religious
freedom, violations continue. Vietnam restricts the practice of religion, detains religious
leaders, and tolerates forced renunciations of faith by local officials.
These acts violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which
Vietnam has acceded. Vietnam's violations of the right to religious freedom have also
drawn the concern of the international community. Specifically, the United States has
called for improvements in Vietnam's religious rights record, utilizing diplomatic means
coupled with continued engagement in the hopes that Vietnam will voluntarily enact
changes. However, this approach has failed to yield concrete progress. In 2004, the U.S.
Department of State designated Vietnam a Country of Particular Concern as provided in
the International Religious Freedom Act.
Because the IRFA mandates affirmative action against violators of religious
freedom, the United States must abandon constructive engagement in Vietnam. Instead,
the IRFA provides the framework for opposing violations under the responsible
engagement doctrine. In doing so, the United States may employ economic pressure to
narrowly target violators, while allowing the liberalizing effect of engagement to
continue where it does not sustain violations. By fully implementing the IRFA in
accordance with the tenets of responsible engagement, the United States would actively
oppose violations rather than engaging Vietnam with the hope that improvements will
occur. Moreover, this extreme makeover of current policy would balance the dual
interests of improved religious freedom and bilateral relations.
1. INTRODUCTION
The government of Vietnam purports to fully protect its citizens'
rights to freedom of belief and religion.' However, this promise of religious
t The author is grateful for the generous guidance and advice of Professor Kathleen O'Neill,
University of Washington School of Law. In addition, the Editorial Staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal provided invaluable assistance and insight. The author also wishes to thank his wonderful family
and friends for their ongoing encouragement, understanding, and support during the writing of this
Comment. Finally, Carly Bums deserves special mention for selflessly volunteering her time and
assistance. Any errors or omissions are the author's own.
, See infra Part Il.A; Vietnam Condemns Human Rights Watch's Report on Religion, VIETNAM
NEWS BRIEF SERVICE, Oct. 25, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 12187610.
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
freedom does not translate into protection of religious rights in practice.
Many Vietnamese laws are hollow with exceptions that threaten to entirely
swallow the right to religious freedom. 2  Religious rights violations in
Vietnam include the arbitrary detention of religious leaders3 and forced
renunciation of Christian faith.4
Despite international scrutiny, Vietnam refuses to acknowledge
violations or make improvements. In response to resolutions denouncing
Vietnam's religious practices, officials deny any abuse and claim that
international pressure constitutes interference with Vietnam's internal
affairs. 5 Moreover, Vietnam's "progress" with respect to religious rights
amounts to little more than specific attempts to alleviate international
scrutiny without committing to lasting change. An example of this behavior
is the government's release of religious dissidents in the face of international
pressure followed by renewed harassment soon thereafter.6
To date, United States foreign policy toward Vietnam has been
characterized by constructive engagement, 7 the theory that increased trade
and economic relations will expose the target country to democratic ideals,
thus effecting improvements in human rights. 8 However, Vietnam's already
poor human rights record has deteriorated in recent years.9  This
deterioration indicates that constructive engagement, as a means of
advancing religious rights, is ineffective in Vietnam. As such, current
United States policy toward religious violations in Vietnam must be re-
evaluated to ensure the protection of religious rights.
This Comment proposes that rather than continuing to follow a policy
of constructive engagement, the United States should address violations of
religious freedom in Vietnam by implementing the International Religious
Freedom Act ("IRFA") 10 in accordance with the tenets of responsible
2 See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
4 See infra Part IV.B.
s See, e.g., Vietnam Condemns U.S. Report on Human Rights, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEF SERVICE, Mar.
2, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 3188219; Vietnam Condemns European Parliament's Religious
Resolution, VIETNAM NEWS BRIEF SERVICE, Nov. 24, 2003.
6 See infra Part IV.A
7 Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America's Response to Religious
Persecution Abroad, 4J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 283,298 (1998).
s See Craig Forcese, Globalizing Decency: Responsible Engagement in an Era of Economic
Integration, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L. 1, 4-7 (2002).
9 See U.S. Dep't of State, Religious Freedom Commission Cites Countries of Particular Concern:
Feb. 18 FPC Briefing by U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Feb. 19, 2004, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2004/Jun/29-559613.htnil (last visited May 29, 2005) [hereinafter FPC
Briefing].
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6401-6481 (2000); see also Statement
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engagement. 11  Specifically, the United States should narrowly tailor
economic sanctions' 2 against Vietnam pursuant to the IRFA. 13 Additionally,
the United States should continue engagement that does not contribute to
continued violations. 14 Part II of this Comment provides background on the
evolving relationship between the United States and Vietnam following the
Vietnam War. Part III demonstrates that the protection afforded to religious
freedom under Vietnam's Constitution and laws is rendered illusory by
exceptions that allow for violations of religious rights to flourish. Part IV
discusses examples of the deteriorating conditions of religious rights in
Vietnam. Part V argues that the United States' policy of constructive
engagement with Vietnam has been ineffective in achieving substantive
rights improvements. Finally, Part VI proposes that implementing the IRFA
in accordance with a responsible engagement policy offers the best solution
for addressing the dual interests of promoting religious rights while
maintaining bilateral relations between the United States and Vietnam.
II. BACKGROUND
The historically unstable diplomatic relations between the United
States and Vietnam stem from a number of categorical differences of
opinion. In recent years, violations of religious freedom emerged as a
serious point of contention and slowed efforts at normalization between the
two countries.
A. The Paris Peace Accord of 1973 Ended Hostilities, But Ushered in the
Economic Isolation of Vietnam by the United States
In order to end hostilities, the United States and Vietnam agreed to the
by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing H.R. 2431, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2149 (Oct. 27,
1998) (IRFA provides the flexibility needed to advance religious freedom worldwide) [hereinafter
President's Statement].
11 Forcese, supra note 8, at 38.
12 Economic sanctions have been defined as the "deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or
threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations." GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY J.
SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY 2 (1985); see also
MICHAEL P. MALLOY, UNITED STATES ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 9-14 (2001)
(discussing the coercive nature of economic sanctions as a tool for forcing change in policies).
13 If a binding agreement setting substantive standards and enforcement mechanisms cannot be
negotiated with Vietnam, the IRFA allows the imposition of one or more of seven listed economic
sanctions as a method of affecting substantive policy change. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(a)-(c), 6445(a)(9)-
(15). Additionally, a commensurate action may be taken, whereby a uniquely tailored response may be
achieved that best addresses U.S.-Vietnam relations. See id. §§ 6442(c)(1)(B), 6445(b).
14 Responsible engagement recognizes that engagement is beneficial only insofar as it does not
contribute to continued violations. Forcese, supra note 8, at 38.
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Paris Peace Accord of 1973,15 which included the Vietnamese people's right
to "freedom of belief."'16 However, the signing of the Paris Peace Accord did
not improve respect for religious rights. After North Vietnam's victory over
South Vietnam in 1975,17 the new government established a number of
repressive social policies. 18 The new regime placed severe restrictions on
religious groups, essentially eviscerating rights guaranteed in Article 11 of
the Paris Peace Accord. 19 Those protesting against the restrictions were
imprisoned, and international actors who objected were accused of
"intervening in Vietnam's internal affairs." 20  In response, the United States
ended virtually all economic interchange with Vietnam.2'
B. Normalized Trade Relations Have Paved the Way for Incremental
Improvements in U.S.-Vietnamese Relations
Although diplomatic and economic relations between the two
countries "remained frozen for over a decade, 22 U.S.-Vietnamese relations
took a major step forward when President William Clinton ordered an end to
the United States' trade embargo against Vietnam.23 Thereafter, the United
States re-established formal diplomatic relations in 1995.24 In 1998,
President Clinton granted a waiver of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,25
15 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam, Jan. 27, 1973, U.S.-Vietnam, 24
U.S.T. I [hereinafter Paris Peace Accord].
16 Id. art. 11.
17 MARK E. MANYIN, THE VIETNAM-U.S. BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE ISSUE REPORT RL30416, at 1 (June 20, 2001).
18 Stephen Denney, The Paris Agreements and Human Rights in Vietnam Today, THE INDOCHINA
NEWSLETTER, Oct. 1979, at 4, available at http://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/-sdenney/ParisAccords-
&_HumanRights (last visited May 29, 2005).
19 Stephen Denney, The Official Policy of Repression in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, THE
INDOCHINA NEWSLETTER, Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 2, available at http:://www.ocf.berkeley.edu/-sdenney/SRV-
Repression-1982 (last visited May 29, 2005); See also Stephen Denney, Religion and State in the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, in RENDER UNTO CAESAR: THE RELIGION SPHERE IN WORLD POLITICS, 357-58
(Sabrina Petra Ramet & Donald W. Treagold eds., 1995) (new regime used legislation as an instrument to
further religious repression).
20 Denney, supra note 18, at 5.
21 MANYIN, supra note 17, at 1.
22 MARK E. MANYIN, THE VIrNAM-U.S. NORMALIZATION PROCESS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE
ISSUE BRIEF IB98033, at 1 (Nov. 28, 2001).
23 Id. at 4.
24 See Phong Tran, Vietnam's Economic Liberalization and Outreach: Legal Reform, LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 139, 161 (2003); 147 CONG. REC. S10105-06 (2001) (statement of Sen. Baucus) [hereinafter
Record]; ASSOC. FOREIGN PRESS, Risking New Row with Vietnam, U.S. Condemns "Harsh" Jailing of
Dissidents, (Sept. 11, 2003), available at http://www.wwm.org/parse.php?idd=9458&c=80 (last visited
May 29, 2005).
25 The Jackson-Vanik Amendment is an amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, conditioning the
restoration of economic benefits to non-market economies on free emigration. See VLADIMIR N. PREGEU,
THE JACKSON-VANIK AMENDMENT: A SURVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, at 2, (Sept. 22, 2000),
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which prohibited normal trade relations with Vietnam.26 On July 13, 2000,
the United States and Vietnam continued to normalize relations 27 by
agreeing to the Bilateral Trade Agreement ("BTA"). 2' After receiving
President Bush's signature, the BTA was congressionally approved in
2001 .29 Each step taken to improve bilateral ties, however, was met with
resistance from opponents in the United States. Those protesting argued that
Vietnam maintained a poor record on human, religious, and labor rights, and
was therefore not entitled to engagement with the United States.3 °
A 2001 issue brief on U.S.-Vietnamese relations noted that Congress
should consider calling attention to Vietnam's record on human and religious
rights, and consider linking these issues to approval of the BTA or the
Jackson-Vanik waiver.31  However, such a connection never occurred. A
joint resolution ratifying the BTA was signed into law32 without explicitly
conditioning normal trade relations upon human rights improvements.
33
Nonetheless, the hope remained that engagement with Vietnam would have a
liberalizing effect, improving the lives of the Vietnamese people.34 Despite
the hope that the BTA would improve human rights,35 and assurances of
available at http://www.aiipowmia.conisea/jacksonvanikrpt.html (last visited May 29, 2005).
26 MANYIN, supra note 17, at 2.
27 Under the BTA, the United States extended normal trade relations to Vietnam in return for an
agreement to trade liberalization measures and market oriented reforms. MANYtN, supra note 22, at 5-6.
28 Agreement Between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Trade Relations,
July 13, 2000, U.S.-Vietnam, Hein's No. KAV 5968, State Department No. 02-9. The full text of the BTA
can be found online at the Office of the United States Trade Representative, Text of the Vietnam Trade
Agreement, at http://www.ustr.gov/World-Regions/Southeast-AsiaPacificVietnam/lection-Index.htnl
(last visited May 29, 2005).
29 MANYIN, supra note 22, at 5.
30 Id. at 1-5. For example, those opposing the ratification of the BTA argued that unconditional
ratification of the BTA is inappropriate given continued religious persecution in Vietnam. 147 CONG. REC.
H5427-02, H5436-37 (Sept. 6, 2001) (statement of Rep. Lofgren) [hereinafter Record 11].
31 MANY1N, supra note 22, at 14. The belief that ratification of the BTA should hinge on human
rights improvements was also shared by others. See, e.g., Record, supra note 24, at S10106-7 (letter from
UCIRF) (noting that the United States should demand improvements in religious freedom as it considers
ratification of the BTA); Religious Persecution in Vietnam and China: Hearing on H.R. 2833 Before the
House Comm. On Int'l Relations Subcomm. On Int'l Operations and Human Rights, 107th Cong. (2002)
(testimony of Michael K. Young, Chair, UCIRF) (noting the Commission's recommendation approval of
the BTA without U.S. actions on religious freedom will lead to continued deterioration of such rights)
[hereinafter Testimony]; MANYtN, supra note 17, at 7 (arguing that the BTA lacks human rights
safeguards).
32 H.R.J. Res. 51, 107th Cong., P.L. 107-52 (2001) (enacted).
33 See MANYIN, supra note 22, at 5.
34 Jared Genser, The Real Scandal About Vietnam, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 2004, at A17; see also
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of State, Vietnam Increasingly Suppresses Religious Freedom, Young Says-
Religious Freedom Commission Chairman's Feb. 12 Remarks to Congress (Feb. 12, 2004) (noting the great
hope that expanded economic ties upon passage of the BTA would lead to human rights improvements)
[hereinafter Genser, Scandal].
35 Press Release Feb. 12, 2004, supra note 34. For example, Senator Kerry noted that while religious
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accelerated reform from the General Secretary of the Vietnamese
Communist Party ("VCP"), 36 Vietnam's human rights record has continued
to decline.
37
C. Religious Rights Are at the Forefront of Continued U.S.-Vietnam
Bilateral Relations
While U.S.-Vietnamese economic relations continue to grow,
improvements in Vietnam's religious policy have not developed at the same
pace. The United States has often utilized diplomatic means such as human
rights dialogues and diplomatic talks to encourage Vietnam to increase
38religious freedoms for its citizens. Such efforts have been largely
unsuccessful. Recently, the United States has taken formal steps to display
its displeasure over Vietnam's religious rights violations and indicate the
importance of religious rights.
39
Trade with Vietnam has increased rapidly since the signing of the
BTA, exceeding US$ 6 billion in 2004.40 This ever-increasing figure is
indicative of a deepening economic relationship between the United States
and Vietnam. Although economic relations between the United States and
Vietnam are rapidly improving, Vietnam continues to fail in satisfactorily
advancing religious rights.4' Because violations of religious freedom
restrictions remained, the situation had changed for the better and would continue to do so. See Record,
supra note 24, at S10115 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: VIETNAM (2003), at http://hrw.org
/wr2k3/asia9.html (last visited May 29, 2005) [hereinafter HRW Report 2003].
37 Id. Vietnam's human rights conditions worsened again during 2004-2005. See HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH 2005 WORLD REPORT: VIETNAM (2005), at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005//01/13/vietna9828.htm
(last visited May 29, 2005). The deterioration in human rights has been particularly disappointing because
of great hopes that expanded U.S.-Vietnamese ties would improve the human rights dialogue. UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL CAUCUS ON
VIETNAM A PEOPLE SILENCED: THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT'S ASSAULT ON THE MEDIA AND ACCESS TO
INFORMATION (2003) [hereinafter Congressional Caucus Testimony] (on file with Journal).
3 See infra Part V.B.
N See U.S. Dep't of State, On the Record Briefing: Release of the 2004 Annual Report on Religious
Freedom, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/36208.htm (last visited May 29, 2005) (remarks
of John Hanford, Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom). The State Department
formally designated Vietnam a CPC as one of the worst offenders of religious freedom. Id.
40 See U.S. Census Bureau, Foreign Trade Statistics-Trade (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance)
with Vietnam, http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradelbalance/c5520.htnd (last visited May 29, 2005). The
United States is now Vietnam's largest trading partner. Vietnam Embassy, Deputy PM Stresses Long-Term
Framework for VN-US Relationship, Dec. 12, 2003, http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/news/
newsitemprint.php3?datestamp=20031212170622 (last visited May 29, 2005).
41 See Press Release Feb. 12, 2004, supra note 34. The State Department "in a report to Congress
admitted to being disappointed by the lack of concrete results in the U.S.-Vietnam bilateral human rights
dialogue," and cited the Vietnamese government's failure to respond to concerns over religious freedom as
a reason for canceling the fall 2003 dialogue. Id.
VOL. 14 No. 3
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continue, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom
("UCIRF")42 recommend more than once4 3 that Vietnam be designated a
Country of Particular Concern ("CPC") under the IRFA.44 Congress finally
heeded this advice in September 2004. 4 5 Absent a binding agreement, the
IRFA provides for economic sanctions or commensurate actions to be
imposed upon CPCs. 4 6 Nonetheless, the United States has declined to levy
economic sanctions, instead choosing to exclusively utilize diplomacy as a
tool with Vietnam in order to maintain bilateral relations.47 Even so, some
members of Congress have called for more active responses in opposition to
violations of religious rights.48
III. VIETNAM PROTECTS RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN NAME, BuT VIOLATES
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN PRACTICE
Vietnam has pledged to protect basic human rights, including the right
to religious freedom, through the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR" )49 and its own Constitution. 50  While these
42 The Commission is an independent body created by the IRFA, with the responsibility of
conducting reviews of religious freedom violations and advising on how to utilize foreign policy to prevent
abuses. See FPC Briefing, supra note 9; K. Connie Wang, Beliefs; U.S. Panel Encourages Religious
Freedom Worldwide; The Commission Monitors Abuses Abroad and Advises Congress and the White
House on Using Foreign Policy to Prevent Such Violations, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2004, at B2.
43 FPC Briefing, supra note 9. The Commission has been "deeply disappointed" by the Secretary of
State's failure to designate Vietnam a CPC. U.S. COMM'N ON INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REP. U.S.
COMMISSION INT'L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2003), available at http://uscirf.gov/countries/publications/
currentreport/2005annualRpt.pdf#page=l (last visited May 29, 2005). UCIRF expressed disappointment
that Vietnam was not designated a CPC in its 2003 Report and urged the State Department to continue to
monitor the countries and make CPC designations throughout the year. Id.
44 Under the IRFA, the President shall review the status of religious freedom in each foreign country
and if that country has engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom, the
country shall be designated a CPC. 22 U.S.C § 6442(b).
45 See Press Release, U.S. State Dep't, U.S. Releases 2004 International Religious Freedom Report
(Sept. 15, 2004), available at 2004 WLNR 2630433 [hereinafter U.S. Releases 2004 Report]; Asia
Dominates U.S. Blacklist of Top Religious Freedom Violators, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 16, 2004.
46 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(a)(2), 6442(c)(1), 6445(a)(9)-(15).
47 See Asia Dominates U.S. Blacklist of Top Religious Freedom Violators, supra note 45.
48 See, e.g., Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2004, H.R. 1587, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter H.R.
1587]; 150 CONG. REC. H5741-04, H5744-5, H5748 (2004) (statements of Reps. Rohrabacher, Lofgren,
and Smith) [hereinafter Record III]; Vietnam Human Rights Act, H.R. 2833, 107th Cong. (2001)
[hereinafter H.R. 28331; 147 CONG. REC. H5413-07, H5417, H5420-2 I, (2001) (statements of Reps. Davis,
Rohrabacher, Lantos, and Smith) [hereinafter Record IV].
49 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Oct. 5, 1977, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
[hereinafter ICCPR].
50 VIETNAM CONST. [CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (1992)], translated in
XX CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992)
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION]. The full text of Vietnam's Constitution is available online at Vietnam
Embassy, Constitution of the S.R. of Vietnam, http://www.vietnamembassy-usa.org/learn/gov-
constitution.php3 (last visited May 29, 2005).
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documents enshrine the right to religious freedom, and officials often refer
to Vietnam's practice of religious tolerance, the Vietnamese government
allows violations to continue. I Most notably, vaguely written laws allow
for far-reaching exceptions to the right of religious freedom, which
perpetuates barriers to the free practice of religion in Vietnam.
A. Vietnam Purports to Protect Religious Freedom
Vietnam maintains that it fully respects religious freedom.5 2
Accordingly, Vietnam is a party to the ICCPR, which requires state parties to
grant their citizens the right to freely practice their chosen religions.53
Moreover, Vietnam's own Constitution and ordinances provide for the
protection of religious freedom.54  Government officials also claim that the
citizens of Vietnam enjoy true religious freedom.55  However, these facial
promises lack true substance.
Vietnam acceded to the ICCPR in 198256 and is therefore bound by its
terms.57 Among the rights protected by the ICCPR, Article 18 specifically
ensures the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.58  This
right is not subject to coercion,59 and may be limited only as necessary to
protect public safety, order, and health interests.60 Each party to the ICCPR
is responsible for respecting and ensuring that all individuals subject to its
jurisdiction receive the rights recognized therein.61 While Vietnam entered a
reservation upon acceding to the ICCPR, the provisions respecting religious
5' See infra Part IV.52 See Vietnam Condemns Human Rights Watch's Report on Religion, supra note 1.
53 See ICCPR, supra note 49.
5 See CONSTITUTION art. 70; Ordinance of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, No.
21/2004/PL-UBTVQH1 1 of June 18, 2004, Regarding Religious Belief and Religious Organizations, art. 8,
sec. 2. An unofficial English translation of the ordinance is available from the website of Human Rights
Watch at http://hrw.orglenglish/docs/2004/10/21/vietna9551.htm (last visited May 29, 2005) [hereinafter
Ordinance].
55 See Vietnam Agency Cites Official on Religious Freedom, US "Biased" Stance, BBC
MONITORING ASIA PACIFIC, Sept. 28, 2004; Vietnam Condemns Human Rights Watch's Report on Religion,
supra note 1.
5 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications-
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratificationl/
3.htm (last visited May 29, 2005) [hereinafter Status of Ratifications].
57 See SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 42 (2d ed. 1984).
58 ICCPR, supra note 49, at art. 18(1). This right includes the freedom to have or adopt a religion or
belief of choice, and to manifest that religion in public or private, through worship, observance, and
practice. Id.
'9 Id. an. 18(2).
60 Id. art. 18(3).
61 id. Each State party to the ICCPR undertakes to adopt such laws and measures as necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the Covenant. Id. art. 2(l)-(2). Each State party must also ensure
that any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective remedy. Id. art. 2(3).
VOL. 14 No. 3
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rights were unaffected.62  Therefore, Vietnam has pledged to provide its
citizens with religious rights as stated in the ICCPR.
The right to religious freedom and belief is also enshrined in
Vietnam's Constitution, which states in relevant part:
The citizen shall enjoy freedom of belief and of religion; he can
follow any religion or follow none. All religions are equal
before the law. The places of worship of all faiths and religions
are protected by the law. No one can violate freedom of belief
and of religion ... 63
On its face, therefore, Vietnam's Constitution provides for the right to
freedom of belief.
Vietnamese ordinances also protect freedom of religion on their face.
According to Vietnamese officials, the State Ordinance on Beliefs and
Religions64 institutionalized the government's religious policies.65 Article I
of the ordinance reaffirms that Vietnam "guarantees freedom of religious
belief and religion for its citizens," and that "[n]obody is permitted to violate
these freedoms. 66
Hiding behind these declarations, Vietnam maintains that its citizens
enjoy true religious freedom. Government officials often refer to these
written statements as proof of Vietnam's commitment to freedom of
67religion. In practice, the permissive laws and the lack of transparency ofthe legal system allow for continued violations of religious freedom to occur.
62 See Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, Declarations and Reservations by Viet Nam Made
upon Ratification, Accession or Succession of the CCPR, http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIMLibrary/RAT1F.nsfI/
058fe36999cclad8cl2568b700535ad6?OpenDocument (last visited May 29, 2005). Vietnam declared that
Article 48, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR was discriminatory because certain states were denied the
opportunity to become parties to the covenant, and noted Vietnam's belief that the covenant should be open
for participation by all parties. Id.
63 CONsTrTUrTON art. 70.
64 Ordinance, supra note 54, art. 1.
65 Vietnam Condemns Human Rights Watch's Report on Religion, supra note 1.
66 Ordinance, supra note 54, art. 8, sec. 2.
67 Dr. Nguyen Thanh Xuan, Deputy Head of the Government Religion Committee, notes Vietnam's
"consistent policy" of allowing religious freedom as evidenced by the right to religious belief and freedom
in the Constitution of Vietnam. Vietnam Agency Cites Official on Religious Freedom, U.S. "Biased"
Stance, supra note 55. Similarly, a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Le Dzung, claims that
Vietnam has a "consistent policy of respecting religious freedom .... Vietnam Condemns Human Rights
Watch's Report on Religion, supra note 1.
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B. Despite Vietnam's Purported Protection of Religious Freedom,
Statutory Vagueness Hobbles Any True Ability to Practice Religion
Freely
Although Vietnam provides for the right to religious freedom, the
many constraints placed upon that right threaten the efficacy of religious
freedom in practice. For example, the Transnational Radical Party's 68 report
to the United Nations Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC")69 focused on
the fact that "despite Vietnam's ratification of the ICCPR and of seven other
international Human Rights [sic] instruments... Vietnamese citizens, as a
matter of fact, do not enjoy any of the rights contained in the ICCPR."7 ° The
report further analyzed Vietnamese legislation concerning religious
tolerance. It noted that the U.N. Special Rapporteur was particularly
concerned with Article 70 of the Vietnamese Constitution, which prioritized
State policies over the right to religious freedom. 7' While Article 70 grants
citizens the freedom of belief, no religious practice may
"contravene... State policies. 72  Accordingly, the Special Rapporteur
characterized the provision as "a vague and extendable concept that could be
potentially restrictive of religious freedom. ,73 Because Article 70 subjugates
the right of religious freedom to State laws and policies, the possibility
remains that the right will be rendered meaningless, particularly where the
government itself tolerates or implements oppressive religious policies.
Additionally, Vietnamese legislation allegedly protecting the freedom
of religious belief is filled with substantial restrictions. A prime example is
the State Ordinance on Beliefs and Religions,74 which subjects religious
liberty to exceptions that reduce freedom of religion to little more than an
68 The Transnational Radical Party is an international association that seeks to create an effective
body of international law with respect for individuals and affirmation of democracy and freedom
throughout the world. RADICALPARTY.ORG, THE PARTY, http://www.radicalparty.org/welcome2.htm (last
visited May 29, 2005).
69 The U.N.H.R.C. is a body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR
by State parties. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights
Committee, http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/index.htm (last visited May 29, 2005).
70 Transnational Radical Party, Report on Vietnam's Compliance with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights Prepared by the Transnational Radical Party for the Human Rights Committee on
the Occasion of the Review of the Country's 2nd Report to the Committee, at iii (2002) [hereinafter TRP
Report] (on file with Journal).
' Id. at 9.
72 CONSTITUTION art. 70.
73 TRP Report, supra note 70, at 9; see also Testimony, supra note 31, para. XI(C)(1) (Vietnam's
Constitution permits restrictions on freedom of religion when furthering "vaguely defined interests of the
State and the Vietnamese Communist Party").
74 Ordinance, supra note 54.
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illusory right. While the right to religious belief is protected by the
ordinance, citizens are
forbidden to abuse the right to freedom of religious belief and
religion to undermine peace, independence and national unity;
to incite violence or to wage war; to disseminate information
against the State's prevailing laws and policies, to sow division
among the people, ethnic groups, and religions; to cause public
disorder; to do harm to other people's lives... ; to hinder
people from exercising their rights and public
obligations... ; and to commit any other acts which breach the
law.
76
The ordinance also allows for the suspension of religious beliefs and
activities when they threaten national security and when they negatively
affect public order, unity of the people, or cultural traditions.77 In addition to
the many exceptions to the right of religious freedom, the ordinance
reiterates the requirement of government oversight and approval. Religious
organizations must be recognized by and registered with an appropriate State
agency,78 and receive approval for many activities, including the training of
clergy, construction of religious facilities, preaching outside a recognized
facility, and evangelizing.79
Parties in both the United States and Vietnam have disparaged the
Ordinance for paying mere lip service to the protection of religious freedom.
Human Rights Watch criticized the ordinance, 80 and noted that the new law
reflects the government's increasing unwillingness "to tolerate religious
practice outside its strict control.",81 The Vietnam Evangelical Fellowship,
an organization of approximately thirty unregistered church organizations
" Id. art. 1.
76 Id. art. 8(2).
77 Id. art. 15.
71 Id. art. 16, 19.
79 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND LABOR, VIETNAM INT'L
RELiGIOUS FREEDOM REP. 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35433.htm (last visited May 29,
2005) [hereinafter 2004 Report]. Religious organizations must register their regular activities with the
authorities annually, and must obtain permission to hold training seminars, conventions, and celebrations
outside the regular religious calendar; to build or remodel places of worship; to engage in charitable
activities or operate religious schools; to train, ordain, promote, or transfer clergy; and to hold large
gatherings. Id.
See Human Rights Watch Slams Vietnam Over Religious Repression, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 22, 2004.
8' Christian Leader Jailed in Vietnam Amid Concern Over Crackdown, AOENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Nov. 12, 2004.
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representing hundreds of house-churches, fears that the legislation will result
in further persecution of its followers.82 U.S. Congressional Representative
Chris Smith (R-N.J.) calls the ordinance an "anti-religious law" that will
increase religious persecution in Vietnam.83 Representative Smith contends
that the new law is a capricious and arbitrary policy designed to incarcerate
believers for any number of reasons, which generally amount to disagreeing
with the government. 84 As such, the ordinance, which professes to protect
freedom of religion, eliminates much of that right and places religious
freedom at the whim of the government.
C. Violations of Religious Freedom in Vietnam Are Not Subject to
Consequences
In practice, there are few effective legal remedies for violations of
religious freedom committed by Vietnamese government officials.
85
Moreover, vaguely defined crimes and broad discretion to implement
administrative probation compounds the problem by creating a permissive
environment where violations go unpunished.86
The Vietnamese penal code establishes penalties for vaguely defined
offenses such as "attempting to undermine national unity," by promoting, ... ... ,,87
"division between religious believers and nonbelievers. Additionally, a
1997 directive on administrative probation gives national and local security
officials broad powers to detain and monitor citizens and control where they
live and work for up to two years if they are believed to threaten "national
security."88  Ongoing complaints allege that officials fabricate evidence and
apply laws in contravention of the right to religious freedom in order to
82 id.
83 Press Release, Representative Chris Smith, House Passes Smith Vietnam Human Rights Act (July
19, 2004), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj04smithNietnam.html (last visited May 29, 2005).
84 Id.
85 2004 Report, supra note 79. The Constitution's national security and solidarity provisions
override guarantees of religious freedom, and these provisions have been used to impede the religious
activities of certain ethnic groups. Id.
86 See Record IV, supra note 48, at 5423 (statement of Rep. Ros-Lehtinen): "Vietnam uses a maze
of laws, decrees and regulations to prohibit religious worship and to justify the arbitrary arrest, detention,
harassment, abuse and censorship of those seeking to exert their religious liberty and their right to free
association."
87 See 2004 Report, supra note 79. When charging an individual with practicing religion illegally,
authorities have utilized Article 258 of the Penal Code, which permits a maximum three-year jail term for
abusing freedom of belief or religion "to infringe upon the interests of the State." Id.
Id.; see also Regulation on Administrative Detention, Decree No. 31-CP, art. 1-2 (1997),
translated in 10 Cong Bao [Official Gazette] 21 (May 31, 1997) (authorities may levy up to two years of
administrative probation for offenses against national security); TRP Report, supra note 70, at 5-6 (Decree
No. CP/31 grants officials the discretionary power to deprive citizens of freedom, without judicial
intervention, for religious activities that are legitimate under international law).
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impede the rights of those practicing unrecognized religions.89 While
serving administrative probation sentences, religious believers remain in
conditions comparable to house arrest. 90
Given the fact that Vietnam's legal system lacks meaningful due
process, authorities generally exercise unfettered discretion over local
religious practices.91 Furthermore, there are no significant punishments for
officials who disregard laws protecting religious practice. Therefore, an
environment exists in Vietnam where violations of religious freedom can
and do occur without redress.
93
IV. VIOLATIONS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM CONTINUE TO OCCUR IN VIETNAM
In addition to creating a permissive environment for religious rights
violations, Vietnam bans and actively discourages participation in
independent religious associations.94  As a threshold requirement, the
government mandates that religious organizations obtain official recognition
to operate. 95  Moreover, Vietnam limits religious activities by
officially-recognized churches whose governing boards are approved and
controlled by the government. 96  When the government withholds official
recognition, religious organizations face severe impediments if they choose
to practice their faith.97 Moreover, religious bodies are confined to spiritual
matters, and are restricted in other activities such as charitable programs.
98
89 See 2004 Report, supra note 79.
9o Id. (noting the use of administrative probation as a tool to control those holding independent
opinions); see also Testimony, supra note 31 (discussing the use of administrative detention to harass
religious believers).
91 See 2004 Report, supra note 79.
92 Id.
9' See infra Part IV.
94 See Human Rights Watch Slams Vietnam over Religious Repression, supra note 80.
95 2004 Report, supra note 79.
96 Human Rights Watch Slams Vietnam over Religious Repression, supra note 80; see also TRP
Report, supra note 70, at 9-10 (noting the requirement of government authorization for religious practices
such as religious education and training); Testimony, supra note 31 (describing the need to obtain
government approval for the "nomination, ordination, or transfer of clergy").
97 See 2004 Report, supra note 79.
98 Id.
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The United Nations,99 foreign governments, 0 0 and human rights
groups 1 have expressed concerns regarding Vietnam's policy toward
freedom of religion. Nonetheless, the government continues to significantly
restrict public religious activities by unrecognized groups, 10 2 and believers
continue to experience harassment when operating without legal
recognition. 10 3  Examples of persecution based on religious belief and
impediments to freedom of religion include arbitrary detention and
imprisonment of religious leaders and followers, 1°4 forced renunciations of
faith, 10 5 acts of violence or reprisal, 106 and heavy governmental control of
religious activities and organizations.10 7  While it is not possible to
determine the exact number of religious detainees, °8 Vietnam's disparate
treatment of unrecognized religious groups such as the Unified Buddhist
Church of Vietnam ("UBCV") and ethnic Protestants is well documented.
A. Vietnam's Treatment of Unrecognized Buddhists Exemplifies Its
Intolerance for Religious Liberties
Wary of popular support for the UBCV, the Vietnamese government
banned the church in 1981.109 In its place, the Vietnamese Buddhist Sangha
99 See, e.g, HRW Report 2003, supra note 36 (The U.N. Commission on Human Rights expressed
concerns about reports of harassment and detention of religious leaders in Vietnam).
100 See, e.g, id. (noting Australia's concerns over Vietnam's rights during its first human rights
dialogue); Vietnam Human Rights, NSW Leg. Assembly (Jun. 21, 2001) (statement of Ms. Meagher,
Cabramatta-Parliamentary Secretary) ("disturbing escalation of human rights breaches in recent times" in
Vietnam); Ben Rowse, EU Urges Vietnam to Improve Its Human Rights Record, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Nov. 26, 2003 (noting the European Union's call on Vietnam to improve human rights after a European
Union troika expressed concerns); EU Voices Concern over Easter Clashes in Vietnam's Central
Highlands, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 20, 2004 (discussing the European Union's request for Vietnam
to improve rights following protests in the Central Highlands).
'o' U.S. Votes to Cap Vietnam Aid, BBC NEWS, Jul. 7, 2004, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
world/asia-pacific/3909013.stm (last visited May 29, 2005); see also Amnesty International, INT'L REP.
2002 VIErNAM, available at http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2002.nsf/asa/viet+nam?Open (last visited May
29, 2005) (discussing Amnesty International's finding of continued repression of religious rights in
Vietnam).
'02 U.S. Releases 2004 Report, supra note 45.
103 See 2004 Report, supra note 79 (listing the abuses of religious freedom suffered by unrecognized
churches); HRW Report 2003, supra note 36 (increasing repression and control over the activities of
banned churches).




1os Id. Lack of transparency in the justice system, difficulty confirming detention or release, and the
prevalence of de facto house arrest make ascertaining the number of religious detainees nearly impossible.
ld.
log Ben Rowse, Vietnamese Buddhist Dissident Calls for Release of Kidnapped Monk, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Aug. 13, 2003.
VOL. 14 No. 3
EXTREME PoLIcY MAKEOVER
("VBS") was created.110 The government requires all Buddhist monks to be
approved by and work under the officially recognized VBS.111 Moreover,
the government influenced the selection of the leadership of the VBS,
excluding many members of the UBCV.
112
Persecution of the now unrecognized UBCV monks has persisted for
decades. In February 1982, Thich Huyen Quang ("Quang") and Thich
Quang Do ("Do"), the leaders of the UBCV, were arrested and banished to
internal exile.1" 3 Since that time, Quang has been kept under effective house
arrest without charge or trial.1 14  While Do was eventually released, he
continued to face harassment from the authorities. In 1995, Do was
sentenced to a five-year prison term for sending overseas faxes accusing the
government of obstructing a church-sponsored flood relief mission.
1 15
Heavy international criticism in 2003 prompted the Vietnamese government
to release Do from a 2001 probationary house arrest two months earlier than
expected. 116  However, human rights groups met Do's release with
skepticism,' 17 characterizing it as an attempt by the government to deflect
external criticism over abuses of religious freedom.
18
This skepticism appears well-founded, as restrictions on the UBCV
have intensified. Following an unauthorized organizational meeting in
2003,119 Vietnam placed many leaders of the UBCV under house arrest
120
110 Id.
111 2004 Report, supra note 79.
112 Id.
113 Didier Lauras, Police in Vietnam Obstruct Assembly of Banned Buddhist Church-UBCV,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 19, 2003.
114 Id. See also Record IV, supra note 48, at H5416 (statement of Rep. Smith) (noting that Quang has
been held under house arrest for over 20 years); Religious Persecution in Vietnam and China, Hearing on
H.R. 2833 Before the Subcomm. of Int'l Operations and Human Rights of the House Comm. On Int'l
Relations, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Dan Duy-Tu Hoang, Vice President or Public Relations,
Vietnamese-American Public Affairs Committee) (testifying that Quang has remained under house arrest
because he is the leader of an unrecognized religious organization).
11 Tini Tran, Monk in Vietnam Presses for Human Rights, AP ONLINE, July 10, 2003.
116 Margie Mason, Vietnam Releases Dissident Monk After Years Under House Arrest, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES, June 30, 2003, at 4; see also Euro MPs Urge Vietnam to Release Aging Buddhist Leaders,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 18, 2003 (noting that thirty-one members of the European Parliament and
the European Union's External Relations Commissioner had pressed Vietnam to release the detained
Buddhist leaders).
117 Mason, supra note 116; see also Tini Tran, Freeing of Monk Sign of Times? Vietnam's Policies
Under Microscope, HOUSTON CHRON., July 11, 2003, at 25.
"85 See Mason, supra note 116; Tini Tran, Freed Vietnamese Monk Still Feisty: Longtime Dissident
Speaks Out After Unexpected Release, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 11, 2003, at 3 (speculating that the
Vietnamese government temporarily eased repression of religious freedom in order to secure WTO
membership).
119 See Lauras, supra note 113; Associated Press, Faith Briefs-Monks Charge Harassment, THE
KANSAS CITY STAR, Sept. 27, 2003; Vietnamese Dissident Buddhist Protests Over Assembly Curbs,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 30, 2003.
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and initiated a renewed crackdown on the UBCV. 12 ' Less than a year after
his early release, Do was also detained after the organizational meeting, and
has been held under de facto house arrest since that time. t 22 In response to
international queries, Vietnamese officials denied forcing monks to boycott
the meeting, and reiterated that the UBCV no longer exists.
Although the UBCV monks have struggled against religious
repression in order to practice their faith, the plight of the UIBCV pales in
comparison to the unrelenting and sometimes violent persecution that ethnic
Protestants face by virtue of their religious beliefs.
B. The Vietnamese Government Also Targets Ethnic Minorities Because
of Their Religious Beliefs
Ethnic minorities have often been the target of Vietnam's intolerance.
Most notably, ethnic Protestants have faced harassment due to their religious
beliefs. 124  Vietnamese authorities have harassed Protestants in the Central
125Highlands since 1975, sometimes forcing them to renounce Christianity
and perform traditional rites such as drinking rice wine mixed with animal
blood. 126  In 2001, the Vietnamese government ordered almost all
unrecognized Protestant congregations in the Central Highlands to close. 127
In April 2001, approximately 20,000 ethnic minorities from the Central
Highlands protested the restrictions on their faith. 2 8  Over 1,000 ethnic
minorities then sought asylum in Cambodia after security forces forcibly put
down their protests.129 The asylum seekers emerged under U.N. protection
and recounted incidents of police repression following the demonstrations. 130
120 See 2004 Report, supra note 79.
121 Ben Rowse, Head of Outlawed Vietnamese Buddhist Says Repression Will Never Work, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 23, 2004; see also Patriarch of Outlawed Vietnamese Buddhist Church Gravely Ill,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 19, 2004 (police commenced a widespread campaign against the UBCV by
placing senior monks under house arrest and hundreds of pagodas under surveillance).
US Ambassador Meets Vietnamese Buddhist Dissident, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 28, 2004;
see also Prominent Buddhist Dissident Slams Vietnam for Arbitrary Detention, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Oct. 28, 2004 (Vietnam's Foreign Ministry Spokesman contends that the monks were not arrested).123 See Lauras, supra note 113.
124 See Record IV, supra note 48, at H5416 (statement of Rep. Smith).
'2 Id. at H5423 (statement of Rep. Ballenger).
126 2004 Report, supra note 79.
127 id.
128 Vietnam Security Forces Patrol Central Highlands After Protests, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr.
11, 2004; see also Record IV, supra note 48, at H5423 (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (participants protested
peacefully).
129 Tension Remains in Vietnam Central Highlands After Protests, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 12,
2004; see also Record IV, supra note 48, at H5423 (statement of Rep. Ballenger) (the government forcibly
responded to protests by dispatching military forces, tanks, and helicopters).
130 Kevin Doyle, After Flight from Vietnam, the Brutal Jungle, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 16, 2004, at
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Vietnamese authorities launched a renewed campaign against ethnic
Protestants in 2003. On April 10, 2003, protests by ethnic minorities in the
Central Highlands were again violently suppressed by police and
government authorities.' 31  Following the protests, minority Protestants
appealed for international assistance after seeking refuge in Cambodia. 132 In
response, the Vietnamese government blocked foreign observers from the
Central Highlands area for two weeks. 33 Even after the area was reopened,
strict oversight by the government made the honest assessment of the state
of affairs extremely difficult to obtain. 3 4  Although the Vietnam News
Service reported that Australian Foreign Ministry officials "acknowledged
that there were no signs of violations of human rights and discrimination" in
the Central Highlands, Australian embassy officials deny that its diplomats
have made public comments about the visit.'
35
To date, the majority of the several hundred Protestant house-churches
closed in 2001 remain officially closed and unrecognized. 136 Moreover, the
U.S. State Department continues to receive persistent reports of officials
pressuring ethnic Protestants to recant their faith, arbitrarily detaining and
sometimes beating religious believers. 37 Local officials have also harassed
unregistered Protestants by forcing church gatherings to cease and
demolishing or closing house-churches.1
38
To address the recurring violations of religious freedom in Vietnam,
the United States has made several attempts to achieve substantive
improvements in religious rights. However, these methods have been
largely ineffective in obtaining concrete results.
2.
131 See 2004 Report, supra note 79; see also Human Rights Watch Slams Vietnam Over "Repression"
of Montagnards, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 14, 2004 (during the first full scale protests since 2001
security forces once again violently clashed with participants); Vietnam Ethnic Groups Hold Rally,
Confront Police, BBC MONITORING NEWSFILE, Apr. 12, 2004 (Vietnamese officials rejected claims of
religious discrimination when questioned about the protests).
132 Doyle, supra note 130; see also 2004 Report, supra note 79; Elizabeth Mills, U.N. Begins
Assessing Needs of Vietnamese Ethnic Group Forced to Flee to Cambodia, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, July
27, 2004.
133 2004 Report, supra note 79; see also Ethnic Minority Protests in Vietnam Could Force
Washington's Hand, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Apr. 14, 2004.
2004 Report, supra note 79.
135 Diplomats Deny Praising Vietnam's Human Rights, ABC NEWS ONLINE, June 29, 2004,
http://www.abc.net.aulnews/newsitemsl20040 6/sl 143012.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2005). For the second
time in 2004, diplomats openly disagreed with state media reports on visits to the region. Id.
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V. THE UNITED STATES' POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT HAS
FAILED TO IMPROVE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN VIETNAM
President Bush declared that the United States will "take special
efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from
encroachment by repressive governments."' 39 The United States, however,
has failed to stand firnly in support of religious freedom in Vietnam.
Current United States policy toward Vietnam can best be categorized
as constructive engagement. 140  In subscribing to constructive engagement,
the United States posits that a strong bilateral relationship and continued
investment, trade, and dialogue with Vietnam will have an overall
liberalizing effect, resulting in the improvement of religious freedom.'14  In
accordance with this policy, the United States normalized relations with
Vietnam in 1995 and agreed to the BTA in 2000.142 Since that time,
engagement has failed to improve the human rights situation in Vietnam, and
religious rights have degenerated. 143 Attempts at diplomacy have also failed
to achieve substantive policy improvements for religious freedom. 144 In
addition, legislative attempts to adopt a more proactive policy in Vietnam
have stalled in the Senate despite overwhelming support by the House of
Representatives. 145 As it stands, the United States policy of engagement has
failed in both achieving substantive improvements and protecting religious
rights in Vietnam.
139 U.S. Releases 2004 Report, supra note 45.
140 McCormick, supra note 7, at 298; see also THE DICTIONARY OF 20TH-CENTURY WORLD POLITICS
173 (Jay M. Shafritz et al. eds. 1993) (defining constructive engagement as "the continuation of political
and economic ties with regimes with which a state has severe disagreements in the expectation that ties will
eventually lead to changes in the objectionable policies and practices"); Forcese, supra note 8, at 4
(defining constructive engagement as involving dialogue rather than isolation); RICHARD N. HAASs AND
MEGHAN L. O'SuLLvAN, HONEY AND VINEGAR 1-2 (Richard N. Hass & Meghan L. O'Sullivan eds., 2000)
(defining engagement as the use of incentives alongside foreign policy to persuade governments to change).
141 See generally Record II, supra note 30, at H5435 (statement of Rep. Evans) (arguing the progress
in human rights can be achieved through engagement and encouraging Vietnam's cooperation); Record,
supra note 24, at S10108, S1011 0 (statements of Sens. Baucus & Grassley) (arguing that the establishment
of normal trade relations with Vietnam complements human rights efforts).
142 See FACT SHEET, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, VIETNAM BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENT-HISTORIC
STRENGTHENING OF THE U.S. VIETNAM RELATIONSHIP (July 13, 2000), available at
http://www.clintonfoundation.org/legacy/
071300-fact-sheet-on-vietnam-bilateral-trade-agreement.htm (last visited May 29, 2005).
141 U.S. Dep't of State, Vietnam Increasingly Suppresses Religious Freedom, Young Says-Religious
Freedom Commission Chairman's Feb. 12 Remarks to Congress, Feb. 13, 2004, available at
http://usinfo.state.gov/dhrl/Archive/2O4/Feb/l 8-682123.html (last visited May 29, 2005).
144 See infra Part V.C.
145 Id.
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A. The United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement Has Not
Improved Religious Freedom
According to Michael Young, chairman of the UCIRF, "increased
trade has not led to progress in the area of protecting human rights and basic
liberties. More dollars have not [led] to democratization. And quiet
diplomacy alone has not produced tangible results." 146  There is
incontrovertible evidence that since the passage of the BTA, the Vietnamese
government continues to pursue suppressive religious policies. 147 Freedom
Now 14 8 recently noted that the U.S. "policy of engagement with Vietnam as
implemented is not working and must be tailored to acknowledge
deficiencies in the performance of the Vietnamese government."' 149 Even the
U.S. Department of State admitted to being "disappointed" by the lack of
"concrete results" from increased U.S.-Vietnamese trade and continued
bilateral human rights dialogue. 50  Despite promises that the BTA and
increased trade would result in improvements,1 5' the state of religious
freedom has deteriorated in recent years.' 52 Moreover, diplomatic talks in
conjunction with increased engagement have similarly failed to generate
lasting policy changes.
B. U.S. Diplomatic Attempts to Improve Religious Rights Have Secured
Few Concrete Commitments
In addition to increased trade and normalization of relations, the
United States has made attenuated efforts to address Vietnam's violations of
religious freedom. Despite ongoing diplomatic efforts, few improvements
have been secured. During the annual U.S.-Vietnamese human rights
dialogue, the United States proposed that Vietnam open access to the Central
14 Genser, Scandal, supra note 34.
147 Id. See also Congressional Caucus Testimony, supra note 37 (listing the pattern of human rights
abuses since the passage of the BTA).
148 Freedom Now is an organization that seeks to represent and secure the release of individuals who
are arbitrarily deprived of their liberty. FREEDOM Now, OVERVIEW, http://www.freedom-now.org/over.php
(last visited May 29, 2005).
:49 Vietnam Lacking in Human Rights, BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Sept. 3, 2004, at 1OB.
50 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 143.
151 See, e.g. Record II, supra note 30, at H5437 (statement of Administration Policy) (U.S.
engagement gives hope of gains in respecting human rights in Vietnam).
152 See HRW Report 2003, supra note 36; see also Religious Persecution in Vietnam and China:
Hearing on "Communist Entrenchment: Religious Persecution in China and Vietnam" Before the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, 107th Cong. (2002) (opening statement of
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chair) (according to the State Department, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International, and others, Vietnam has regressed in the realm of religious freedom and tolerance);
Testimony, supra note 31 (noting deteriorating religious freedom conditions).
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Highlands, release political prisoners and authorize return visits by U.N.
Special Rapporteur, but Vietnam made few concrete commitments. 53 In
previous meetings, the United States urged recognition of a broad spectrum
of religious groups, sought greater freedom for recognized groups, and
focused on curbing specific abuses, such as forced renunciations of faith and
the re-opening of closed house churches. 154 In order to signify displeasure
over the limited progress, the U.S. Department of State elected to withdraw
from a human rights dialogue with the Vietnamese government in 2003.155
In the 2004 International Religious Freedom Report ("2004 Report"),
the U.S. Department of State chronicled the many diplomatic attempts aimed
at addressing religious freedom in Vietnam over the course of the year.156
These attempts included: (1) visits from the United States Ambassador at
Large for International Religious Freedom to Vietnam to press for greater
religious freedom;15 7  (2) three visits to Vietnam from the Office of
International Religious Freedom; 58 (3) consistent pressure by United States
officials for the release of religious prisoners, a ban on forced renunciations
of faith, an end to physical abuse of religious believers, and the re-opening
of hundreds of closed churches in the Central Highlands; 159 (4) regularly
raised concerns with Vietnamese leaders by Embassy and Consulate officials
regarding religious freedom concerns; 160 (5) discussion of religious rights
issues by the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs at the
annual bilateral political dialogue in Hanoi; 161 and (6) regular meetings with
religious leaders and travels throughout Vietnam to investigate reports of
religious freedom violations by the Embassy and Consulates. 162
In spite of many diplomatic overtures, the 2004 Report indicated only
isolated and specific successes, as opposed to substantive policy changes.
The 2004 Report noted that, in response to United States dialogue,
Vietnamese authorities withdrew threats of demolishing a single church and
also permitted access to imprisoned religious leaders Nguyen Van Ly and
UBCV patriarch Quang. 16 3 In spite of these isolated successes, the Report
153 HRW Report 2003, supra note 36.









163 See 2004 Report, supra note 79.
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declared Vietnam one of the world's worst offenders of religious freedom,
64
and downgraded Vietnam's status to a CPC.165  Despite the admitted
diplomatic failures, former Secretary of State Powell affirmed that the
United States would continue to use diplomacy with Vietnam to encourage
policy changes. 166  Secretary Powell noted that existing partnerships are
"one of the best methods.., to encourage... friends to adopt tolerant
practices.' 67  While the United States continues to pursue constructive
engagement despite less than satisfactory results, members of Congress have
introduced legislation that specifically targets Vietnam's human rights
situation and requires affinmative action on the part of the United States.
C. Legislative Attempts Seeking Affirmative U.S. Action to Oppose the
Violations of Religious Freedom in Vietnam Have Stalled
The House of Representatives passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act
("H.R. 2833") in 2001 to send a clear message to the government of Vietnam
that the "United States is serious about its commitment to the principles of
free speech, freedom of expression, and the freedom of religious
exercise."' 168 Section 201 of the Act limits non-humanitarian aid to current
levels unless the government of Vietnam makes substantial progress in
releasing religious prisoners, respecting the right to freedom of religion,
returning property of the churches, and respecting the rights of ethnic
minorities. 69 As such, H.R. 2833 seeks to link economic repercussions to
Vietnam's continued violations of human rights, rather than continuing the
policy of constructive engagement. The U.S. President, however, maintains
authority to waive these provisions upon determining that doing so will
promote the interests of the Act or is otherwise in the United States' national
interest.17
0
H.R. 2833 received an overwhelming 410-1 vote in passing the
House,' 7 ' but was subsequently blocked in the Senate. 72  Senator John
164 See U.S. Releases 2004 Report, supra note 45.
165 Id. (designating Vietnam a CPC for the first time); see also Assistant Secretary of State
Department Paul V. Kelly letter to Congressman Lane Evans regarding designation of Vietnam as a CPC,
Oct. 12, 2004 (Vietnam was designated a CPC because diplomatic attempts had failed) (on file with
Journal).
'66 Asia Dominates U.S. Blacklist of Top Religious Freedom Violators, supra note 45.
167 id.
168 Record IV, supra note 48, at H5417 (statement of Rep. Davis).
169 See H.R. 2833, supra note 48, sec. 201(a).
"' Id. sec. 201(b)(3)
171 Record IV, supra note 48, at H5426 (Roll No. 335); see also Record, supra note 24, at S10106
(printing Roll No. 335 into the record without objection); 147 CONG REc. D871-01, D871 (2001) (noting
passage of H.R. 2833 by the House).
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Kerry (D-Mass), with the backing of Senator John McCain (R-Ariz),
explained his opposition to the legislation by insisting that the carrot of
engagement would do more to nurture human rights in Vietnam than the
stick of sanctions. 173 Recognizing the deterioration of religious freedom in
Vietnam despite the current policy of constructive engagement, the U.S.
House of Representatives passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act of 2004
('H.R. 1587"),174 essentially the same legislation as H.R. 2833.175 H.R. 1587
was subsequently submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, but
no further action has been taken in the Senate.
In light of the failure of the BTA, diplomatic attempts, and proposed
legislation to achieve lasting religious rights improvements in Vietnam, the
United States policy of constructive engagement must be re-evaluated.
VI. THE UNITED STATES MUST IMPLEMENT IRFA ACTIONS UNDER THE
RESPONSIBLE ENGAGEMENT DOCTRINE RATHER THAN CONTINUE
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT
As a result of Vietnam's deteriorating record on religious freedom and
the failure of the United States policy of constructive engagement, a new
strategy must be developed. This Comment proposes that an appropriate
alternative to current United States policy is the implementation of the IRFA
in accordance with the doctrine of responsible engagement. 176  The IRFA
172 Record 11, supra note 48, at H5743 (statement of Rep. Smith) (noting that H.R. 2833 never
received a vote after being blocked in the Senate); Record, supra note 24, at S10119 (statement of Sen.
Smith) (discussing the secret hold placed on H.R. 2833).
173 Ted Sampley, John Kerry's Sabotage of Vietnam Human Rights Act, U.S. VETERAN DISPATCH,
http://www.vietnamveteransagainstjohnkerry.com/kerry-human -rights.htm (last visited May 29, 2005); see
also Quynh-Giang Tran, Kerry Stand Upsets Some Vietnamese, BOSTON GLOBE, at A4, Aug. 14, 2002
(Sen. Kerry noted that ongoing relations with Vietnam would promote greater freedom while the Vietnam
Human Rights Act undermined the United States' ability to promote economic reforms); Patrick
Goodenough, Refugees from Vietnam Unimpressed with Kerry, CNSNews.com, Aug. 31, 2004, available
at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewForeignBureaus.asp?Page=%5C%5CForeignBureaus%5C%5Carchive%
5C%5C200408%5C%5CFOR20040831a.htmi (last visited May 29, 2005) (explaining how Sen. Kerry
blocked the Vietnam Human Rights Act and expressed concern that denying aid would slow human rights
improvements).
'74 See H.R. 1587, supra note 48; see also Record III, supra note 48, at H5743-45, H5748 (statements
of Reps. Smith, Rohrabacher, Lofgren arguing for the passage of H.R. 1587 because of the deteriorating
rights situation and lack of substantive change achieved through current policy); 150 CONG. REC. D793-01
(2004) (Roll No. 391) (HR. 1587 passed the House by a 323-45 vote).
'75 Compare H.R. 1587, supra note 48, at sec. 101 (prohibiting non-humanitarian assistance to the
government of Vietnam in an amount exceeding the amount provided in the previous fiscal year unless the
government has made substantial progress in human rights such as respecting the right to religious
freedom), and H.R. 2833, supra note 48, at sec. 201 (prohibiting United States non-humanitarian assistance
to the government of Vietnam unless substantial progress in human rights is made, including respect for
religious freedom and the release of religious prisoners).176 The doctrine of responsible engagement supports the idea that economic engagement, integration,
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provides the United States with specific responses to international violations
of religious freedom, including economic sanctions against severe
violators. 177 Ineffectual diplomatic attempts and CPC designation alone are
insufficient under the IRFA. In following the doctrine of responsible
engagement and the directives of the IRFA, the United States should
narrowly apply economic pressure in the form of targeted IRFA sanctions
against the government of Vietnam. At the same time, the United States
should continue to engage Vietnam where doing so does not support
continued religious violations. For example, the United States should
continue to provide humanitarian aid such as food, medicine, and AIDS/HIV
programs. 178  By implementing IRFA in accordance with the tenets of
responsible engagement, the United States would follow the IRFA mandate
of action.179  Moreover, the United States would take an active role in
opposing violations of religious freedoms without levying comprehensive
sanctions and completely severing bilateral relations. Therefore, the United
States dual interests in improved religious freedom and continued relations
would be balanced, and religious rights would be enhanced by utilizing
pressure and engagement.'
80
A. The International Religious Freedom Act Mandates Affirmative
Action, Including Targeted Economic Sanctions
The IRFA mandates that the United States designate severe violators
of religious freedom as CPCs. 181 Following such a designation, the United
and growth are consistent with "human rights-responsible developments." It recognizes, however, that in
some cases continued engagement encourages human rights violations by directly or indirectly assisting
violators. To address this conflict, the doctrine permits economic sanctions specifically targeted at
offenders, thereby minimizing the negative affect felt by innocents. See Forcese, supra note 8, at 37.
177 See 22 U.S.C. § 6445.
17' "In FY2002, total U.S. assistance to Vietnam-which includes USAID programs-is expected to
exceed US $30 million, which includes funds budgeted for food assistance (US $11 million), the Fulbright
exchange program (US $4 million), HIV/AIDS programs (US $8.5 million), land mine victims and orphans
(US $3 million), a U.S. Department of Labor technical cooperation program (US $1.5 million), and
technical assistance to help Vietnam understand, develop, and implement trade reforms (US $4.6 million).
This total includes US $5 million that is budgeted for a new educational exchange program-the Vietnam
Education Foundation-that Congress authorized in 2000 but has yet to be implemented." MARK E.
MANYiN, THE VIETNAM-U.S. NORMALIZATION PROCESS, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE ISSUE BRIEF
IB98033, at 1 (June 6, 2002).
179 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6441(b)(1), 6442(c)(l)-(2), and 6445(a)(l)-(15) (requiring that the United States
President take action as provided in the IRFA in response to violations of religious freedom).
180 In debating ratification of the BTA, Rep. Levin noted the struggle for a formula that combines
engagement and pressure and argued that any House action must both engage and pressure Vietnam.
Record II, supra note 30, at H5429.
"' See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6441(b)(1), 6442(c)(l)-(2), and 6445(a)(1)-(15); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, A
Preliminary Response to Criticisms of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2000 BYU L. REV.
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States must take further actions to oppose the violation. While the United
States has taken the first step in recognizing Vietnam as a CPC, 182 the
designation alone is insufficient to affect change. Therefore, the United
States must also take affirmative action as provided in the IRFA, including
economic sanctions.183
The IRFA establishes that it is the policy of the United States to
condemn violations of religious freedom and promote the fundamental right
of religious freedom.184 Any action under the IRFA must be flexible to
achieve "the most effective and principled response," reflecting both the
violation and the status of relations with the offending nation.
85
Accordingly, the IRFA mandates specific action in opposition to abuses, 86
categorizing offenses as either "violations of religious freedom" or
"particularly severe violations of religious freedom."1T7  While the IRFA
allows some discretion in choosing how the United States will react to a
violation, some action must be taken188 unless the requirement is waived by
the U.S. President.'
89
In response to "violations of religious freedom," the President of the
United States must take one or more of fifteen possible actions, or negotiate
and enter into a binding agreement with the government of the offending
country. The available actions range in seriousness from a private
demarche to any number of targeted economic options, such as the
withdrawal or limitation of development assistance. 191The IRFA also mandates opposition to "severe violations of religious
841, 858-59 (2000) (discussing the requirement of action under the IRFA).
182 Institute on Religion and Public Policy, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, and Vietnam Added to List of
Countries of Particular Concern for Severe Violations of Religious Freedom, Sept. 15, 2004, available at
http://www.religionandpolicy.org/show.php?p=1.1.1317 (last visited May 29, 2005); see also 22 U.S.C. §
6442(b)(1)(A) (2001) (requiring designation of severe violators of religious freedom as CPCs).
113 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(a)(2), 6442(b)(2), 6442(c), and 6445(a).
' Id. § 6401(b)(1).
185 Id. § 6401(b)(3).
186 Id. §§ 6441(b)(1), 6442(c)(1)-(2), and 6445(a)(1)-(15).
187 Compare 22 U.S.C. § 6441 (2001), and 22 U.S.C. § 6442 (2001) (distinguishing the requirement
of action as between violations of religious freedom and particularly severe violations of religious
freedom); see also 22 U.S.C. §§ 6402(11), (13) (definition of "violations of religious freedom" and
"particularly severe violations of religious freedom").
1' See 22 U.S.C. § 6441(a)(1)(B), 6442(a)(2), and 6445(a)(l)-(15); see also Steven Wales,
Remembering the Persecuted: An Analysis of the International Religious Freedom Act, 24 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
579, 594 (2002) (noting that discretion is granted as to the manner of acting but not with respect to the
decision to act itself).
..9 See 22 U.S.C. § 6447(a)(l)-(3). Waiver can only occur after it is determined and reported to
Congress that: (1) the foreign government has ceased the violations; (2) a waiver would further the
purposes of the IRFA; or (3) an important national interest of the United States requires the waiver. Id.
188 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6441(a)(l)(B), 6441(b)(1)(A)-(B).
191 Id. § 6445(a)(l)-(15).
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freedom that are or have been engaged in or tolerated by the governments of
foreign countries."' 92 For particularly severe violations, defined as engaging
in or tolerating "ongoing, systematic, and egregious"', 93 violations of
religious freedom, the IRFA first requires CPC designation. 194 In order to
promote religious freedom in countries designated as CPCs, the President
must then select from seven targeted economic sanctions that are
enumerated in the IRFA. 195 Economic actions may not be taken until after
consultations with the offending government, humanitarian organizations,
and interested United States parties. 196 The President must also submit a
report to Congress which: (1) identifies the presidential action to be taken;
(2) describes the violations; (3) describes the purpose of the actions; and (4)
evaluates the impact of the actions.' 97 Additionally, a statement of policy
options and a description of multilateral negotiations must be submitted
prior to acting.' 98 The President, however, may also take alternative action
"commensurate in effect" to the options given in the IRFA, when in
furtherance of United States policy as set forth in the IRFA.' 99 Finally, the
President may conclude a binding agreement requiring the offending
government to cease, address, and phase out the act, policy, or practice
constituting the violation. 200  Therefore, the plain language of the IRFA's
provisions requires that the United States not only designate Vietnam a CPC,
but also that it resort to economic sanctions absent a presidential waiver or
binding agreement.
Admittedly, CPC designation is a flexible diplomatic tool that
provides the President with a range of specific options to address abuses of
religious freedom. 201 When used properly, CPC designation: (1) sends a
clear message that the United State is concerned about human rights; (2)
starts a dialogue in which specific benchmarks of progress are agreed upon;
(3) allows the threat of multiple and ongoing sanctions to address egregious
abuses of religious freedom; and (4) allows the President to waive any
specific actions if progress is being made toward addressing serious
religious freedom abuses.20 2 CPC designation alone, however, is unlikely to
'92 Id. §§ 6442(a)(1)-(2).
"'s Id. § 6402(11).
'94 Id. § 6442(b)(1)(A).
'9' See id. §§ 6442(a)(2), 6442(c)(1)(A), and 6445(a)(9)-(15).
'96 Id. §§ 6442(c)(1), 443.
'97 Id. §§ 6442(c)(1), 6444(a)(1)-(4).
'9' Id. §§ 6444(a)(5)-(6).
'99 Id. §§ 6442(c)(1)(B), 6445(b).
200 Id. §§6442(c)(2), 6445(c).
20' See Press Release Feb. 12, 2004, supra note 34; President's Statement, supra note 10.
202 Press Release Feb. 12, 2004, supra note 34.
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ensure Vietnam's conformity with international religious rights standards.
The designation of a government as a CPC is only a first step in
achieving substantive improvements in religious rights.2 °3 Significant
improvement in the religious rights environment of a CPC has not occurred
in the absence of strong and decisive involvement by the United States
government. 20 4 Accordingly it is clear that "simply putting a name of a
country on a list is not enough to guarantee freedom of belief, expression,
and practice of one's most fundamental beliefs. 2°5  In fact, the IRFA
recognized this reality and mandated further action by the United StatesS • 206
toward severe violators following CPC designation. Accordingly, the
United States must apply economic pressure under the IRFA if a binding
human rights agreement cannot be reached with Vietnam.
In sum, the IRFA mandates designation of severe violators of religious
freedom as CPCs. The United States has taken this first step by designating
Vietnam as a CPC. The IRFA mandates further action, specifically
207providing that absent a waiver or binding agreement, the President must
choose one of the economic sanctions provided.20 8 Therefore, the United
States must turn to targeted economic sanctions under the IRFA to address
continuing religious violations in Vietnam. While the IRFA provides general
guidelines as to the applicability of economic sanctions, an application of the
IRFA under the responsible engagement doctrine best addresses the
particularities of the U.S.-Vietnamese relationship.
B. IRFA Remedies in Accordance with Responsible Engagement Allow
for a More Nuanced Response That Better Addresses the Unique
Problems of Pursuing Religious Freedom and Economic Relations
The prevailing view of Western countries such as the United States is
that constructive engagement with repressive regimes through trade,
investment, and dialogue will induce human-rights-sensitive development.20 9
Those opposing this position argue that economic engagement and
liberalization increase many of the human rights violations that they are
203 Institute on Religion and Public Policy, supra note 182.
204 id.
205 id.
206 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442(b)-(c).
207 Id. §§ 6442(c)(2), 6445(c), and 6447.
208 Id. §§ 6442(a)(2), 6442(c)(1)(A); see also § 6441(c)(1)(C) (for violations of religious freedom, the
President must make every reasonable effort to conclude a binding agreement concerning cessation of
violations with countries that have diplomatic relations with the United States); § 6445(b) (the President
may also select a commensurate action instead of an enumerated action).
209 Forcese, supra note 8, at 1.
VOL. 14 No. 3
EXTREME POLICY MAKEOVER
intended to cure.210 Advocates of economic sanctions believe that given lax
211international enforcement, unilateral actions may be the only way to
212achieve improvements. Moreover, sanctions may also aid in the
development of international human rights norms by bringing public
attention to violations.213 Critics of economic sanctions, however, argue that
sanctions are blunt mechanisms that punish innocent citizens, while those in
214control are largely able to shield themselves from the negative effects. In
light of this debate, the more nuanced approach of responsible engagement
has been promulgated by some commentators.215
Responsible engagement recognizes that blind economic investment
alone may not be appropriate in all circumstances, particularly where
"economic engagement will acerbate repressive regimes and human
suffering" by contributing indirect support for the violations that are sought
to be improved.2t 6 As such, responsible engagement requires targeted
economic sanctions that affect the offending government, while minimizing
217the adverse impact on innocent citizens. Given the limited success of the
United States' constructive engagement policy, following the tenets of
responsible engagement in implementing the IRFA constitutes the superior
method of promoting religious freedom in Vietnam. By utilizing a mixed
plan of targeted economic sanctions and continuing engagement where it
does not contribute to violations of religious freedom, the United States can
achieve substantive improvements.21 8
210 Id.
211 Margo Kaplan, Using Collective Interest to Ensure Human Rights: An Analysis of Articles on
State Responsibility, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1902, 1912 (2004); see also Amy Howlett, Getting 'Smart':
Crafting Economic Sanctions that Respect All Human Rights, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 1210-11 (2004);
RICHARD B. LILLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS OF LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 210 (3d ed. 1995); DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 37
(1999); Anne F. Bayefsky, The U.N. and International Protection of Human Rights, in RETHINKING
HUMAN RIGHTS 80-81, 85-86 (Brian Galligan & Charles Sampford eds., 1997).
512 Kaplan, supra note 211, at 1912.
213 Id. at 1914; Howlett, supra note 211, at 1220-22; Sarah H. Cleveland, Norm Internalization and
U.S. Economic Sanctions, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (2001); Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of
Economic Sanctions, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT 277-78 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).214 Howlett, supra note 211, at 1217-18; see also Damrosch, supra note 213, at 275; HAASS &
O'SULLIVAN, supra note 140, at 2; HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT 662-63 (2d ed. 2000); DAVID CORTRIGHT & GEORGE A. LOPEZ, THE SANCTIONS DECADE 23-
26 (2000).
':' Forcese, supra note 8, at 3.
516 See id. at 11.
217 Id. at 32-38.
218 See CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 214, at 29-30; see also HAASS & O'SULLVAN, supra note
140, at 160, 174-5 (Reality dictates that in every engagement strategy the target country retains the ability
to either ensure success or force failure. Therefore, an effective engagement strategy utilizing incentives
must also include credible penalties.).
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To more effectively address the problem of continuing religious rights
violations in Vietnam, the United States should implement the IRFA in
accordance with the doctrine of responsible engagement. In doing so, the
United States should develop and implement a targeted economic sanction
plan, and continue not only humanitarian assistance, but also other forms of
engagement where doing so does not sustain the violations. Both the
available range of IRFA actions and the IRFA's framework suggest that the
IRFA only permits targeted sanctioning.2 19  Moreover, responsible
engagement counsels toward the use of narrowly targeted economic
sanctions because the doctrine recognizes both the need for economic
sanctions and also the potential for such sanctions to cause harm.22° In fact,
the United States should forgo the use of an enumerated IRFA sanction in
favor of a commensurate action, whereby the President may craft a tailored
221
economic response that will apply appropriate pressure to Vietnam.
Additionally, in following the doctrine of responsible engagement under the
IRFA, the United States should engage Vietnam to the extent that it does not
aid in sustaining continued violations.222 While the IRFA only requires that
humanitarian aid must continue,223 the United States must engage further in
relations deemed permissible under the doctrine. By narrowly targeting
sanctions and continuing to engage where possible, the danger of
comprehensive sanctions is eliminated and the negative effect on the general
population is minimized.224 Moreover, the IRFA provides that the President
must minimize the adverse impact on the target country's population and
225
humanitarian activities when utilizing economic sanctions.
In sum, the IRFA and the doctrine of responsible engagement are
compatible and capable of joint implementation to address the continued
violations of religious freedom in Vietnam. Through this approach, the
219 See, e.g, 22 U.S.C. § 6442(c)(2) (IRFA requires a determination of the party responsible for the
violations in order to appropriately target actions); STEINER, supra note 214, at 1107 (noting the IRFA's
mandate to precisely determine the responsible party); § 6441 (c)(l)(A)-(B) (requiring consideration of the
severity of the violation and the implementation of an appropriate and narrow response directed at the
specific party responsible for the violations); §§ 6445(a)(9)-(15) (the economic sanctions enumerated in the
IRFA are narrow rather than comprehensive).
220 See Forcese, supra note 8, at 38.
221 See 22 U.S.C. § 6442(c)(1)(B).
222 See Forcese, supra note 8, at 3, 32-8.
223 22 U.S.C. § 6445(d).
224 See Howlett, supra note 211, at 1217-18 (because comprehensive sanctions may cause severe
civilian suffering, narrowly targeted sanctions were developed to affect the guilty parties alone); Damrosch,
supra note 213, at 281-84 (suggesting that an effective sanctions program minimizes civilian impact,
targets guilty parties, and prevents enrichment of violators); CORTRIGHT & LOPEZ, supra note 214, at 223-
24, 227 (arguing that targeted sanctioning and humanitarian exemptions ameliorate civilian suffering).
225 See 22 U.S.C. § 6441(c)(2)(A)-(B).
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United States would not categorically isolate Vietnam. Moreover, this
proposed solution would allow the United States to implement the requisite
actions of the IRFA, actively apply pressure to the Vietnamese government,
and send the message that religious freedom must be protected. All of this
would be accomplished without needlessly endangering the population of
Vietnam or unequivocally severing bilateral relations. Therefore,
implementation of IRFA in accordance with the tenets of responsible
engagement provides a better method of addressing religious rights
violations in Vietnam than continued constructive engagement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States policy of constructive engagement has failed to
produce substantive improvements in religious freedom in Vietnam.
Additionally, bilateral relations and diplomatic measures alone do not
provide redress for the recurring violations or religious freedom. Regardless
of current policy, the IRFA exists to address precisely this type of
international violation of religious freedom and demands specific response
by the United States. Vietnam's designation as a CPC is only the first step.
If a binding agreement cannot be negotiated, the IRFA mandates the use of
targeted economic sanctions absent Presidential waiver. Due to concerns
over improving bilateral relations and promoting religious rights, a proper
remedy must balance both interests. Accordingly, the United States should
implement a targeted economic option under the IRFA in accordance with
the tenets of the responsible engagement doctrine.
Specifically, the United States should develop and enact a tailored
economic response that affects only those government actors responsible for
the violation. Moreover, humanitarian aid must continue, and other steps
should be taken to minimize any adverse impact on innocents. Finally, the
United States should continue humanitarian programs or any other forms of
engagement in Vietnam so long as the engagement itself does not support
further violations. Because a dual IRFA and responsible engagement policy
allows engagement with Vietnam to coexist with interests in religious rights
improvements, this proposed solution provides a more appropriate policy
than continued constructive engagement.
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